1 Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss the relationship between Anthropology and Conversation Analysis (CA). After briefly describing what Anthropology is and the intellectual history of the relationship between Anthropology and CA, I focus on the ways in which each field has influenced the other.

Anthropology is the study of the human species in its present and past diversity from a holistic and empirical perspective. With this wide-ranging and inclusive approach to the study of the human experience, North American Anthropology is made up of four subfields: sociocultural anthropology, physical anthropology, archeology, and linguistic anthropology. Culture is considered a central aspect of what makes us human, but anthropologists do not share a single definition of culture. In fact, definitions of and disagreements about culture abound across anthropological subfields and theoretical approaches. Duranti (1997a) devotes an entire chapter of his linguistic anthropology textbook to present six definitions of culture: culture as (i) distinct from nature, (ii) knowledge, (iii) communication, (iv) a system of mediation, (v) a system of practices, and (vi) systems of participation. Despite the differences, a general understanding exists around a definition of culture as the component of human experience that is not biologically transmitted, but rather learned and passed among and between populations across time and space. To study culture, anthropologists often conduct in situ observation and data collection to create an ethnography (Malinowski, 1967 [1922]). Ethnography is “thick” description (Geertz, 1973) of human social phenomena in the natural and local settings within which they emerge and acquire meaning. Once such interpretative, comprehensive, complex and local “thick description” of a community’s meaning-making is achieved, it is subjected to further examination within a cross-cultural perspective.
Because of its interest in the sociocultural study of language as central to what makes us human, the subfield of linguistic anthropology has had the most affinity with CA. In linguistic anthropology, language—communication—is theorized as a constitutive component of culture: language is a cultural resource and speaking a cultural practice (Duranti, 1997a: 1–22). Within linguistic anthropology, anthropologists interested in “interaction-centered anthropology of language” (Schegloff, Ochs & Thompson, 1996: 7) have frequently dialogued with CA.

Three time periods can be established in a brief summary of the intellectual history between Anthropology and CA. In a first period encompassing the 1960s–1970s, CA shared publications with Anthropology—particularly anthropologists working within Hymes and Gumperz’s ethnography of communication—under the umbrella of sociolinguistics (Giglioli, 1972; Gumperz & Hymes, 1972). They shared an interest in data-driven sociocultural analyses of observable language use in its context of production and interpretation, were reacting to Chomsky’s exclusive focus on linguistic competence (Chomsky, 1965; Hymes, 1972), and were attempting to uncover the organizational components, structures and principles underlying the great variety of language use.

In a second time period of the 1980s–1990s, CA established itself, differentiating its approach from related fields that often did not welcome it (Schegloff, 1997d, 1998c; Sharrock & Anderson, 1987; see also Heritage, 2008b). During this period, anthropologists and conversation analysts debated over the autonomous nature of conversation, its universality and its primordiality for human sociality. At the root of these debates lies a fundamental theoretical disagreement about whether there is something in interaction that can be characterized as autonomous (Cameron, 2008; Duranti, 1997a, 2005; Enfield & Levinson, 2006; Gaudio, 2003; Kulick, 2005; Levinson, 2005; Manning, 2008; Moerman, 1988; Reisman, 1974; Schegloff, 2005b; Sidnell, 2000, 2009b; Silverstein, 1997). This theoretical disagreement is also at the root of the anthropological critique of CA’s disinterest in the ‘larger context’, which Duranti (1997a: 264–77) breaks down into three components: (i) the autonomy of conversational mechanisms; (ii) relevance (i.e. what features of context can be invoked in accounting for talk and how); and (iii) meaning (i.e. conversation analysts locate meaning in talk-in-interaction whereas anthropologists locate meaning in talk and other social systems).

On the basis of the disagreement about the autonomous nature of conversation, there have been repeated—and often seemingly irreconcilable (Bilmes, 1985; Sanders, 1999)—methodological debates over questions such as:

- what constitute talk-intrinsic (i.e. endogenous to the interaction) vs. talk-extrinsic (i.e. exogenous to the interaction) data, and whether making such distinction is possible altogether;
- how different types of talk-extrinsic data (particularly information that the researcher has collected via observation, questionnaires and interviews, but also information the researcher already has as a native speaker and/or member of a culture) are to be invoked to account, explicate and interpret why participants do what they do at a specific and short-lived moment of an interaction (Beach,
1990/91b; Bilmes, 1996; Hopper, et al., 1990/91; Mandelbaum, 1990/91; Moerman, 1988, 1996; Seedhouse, 1998; ten Have & Psathas, 1995a: xvi–xvii); how to analyze data, i.e. whether a bottom-up analysis in which cultural analysis is postponed until after the technical description of talk-intrinsic data is completed, is in fact possible or desirable; what kind of a research tool the transcript is (Ashmore, MacMillan & Brown, 2004; Ashmore & Reed, 2005; Bilmes, 1996; Bucholtz, 2000; Duranti, 1997a; Edwards & Lampert, 1993; Ochs, 1979; Silverstein, 1997).

The third time period in the relationship between Anthropology and CA coincides with the beginning of the 21st century. This period is characterized by a degree of interdisciplinary convergence not seen since the 1970s. Described as “rapprochement” (Sidnell, 2008), three research areas characterize this renewed interdisciplinary convergence: (i) comparative CA (Sidnell, 2007a, 2009b); (ii) explorations of the articulation of culture, cognition and social interaction, as they constitute the basic aspects of human sociality (Duranti, 2005; Enfield & Levinson, 2006a; Levinson, 2005, 2006a); and (iii) the contribution made by linguistic anthropologists to CA’s “second-wave” of person reference research (Lerner & Kitzinger, 2007b: 428; see also Enfield & Stivers, 2007). Despite the often contentious relationship between anthropology and CA, a number of anthropologists—particularly Moerman, M. H. Goodwin, and more recently, Sidnell and Clemente—have adopted CA as a fundamental research method to conduct ethnography. CA and its antecedent, ethnomethodology (see Heritage & Stivers, this volume; Maynard, this volume), provide an even more precise tool to identify and describe formally how participants produce and recognize commonsense structures of reasoning and social action (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970). Instead of relying on interview accounts produced for the researcher, the researcher’s post-hoc rendering of what happened, and his/her interpretive work, anthropologists turn to CA because it allows them to:

• examine cultural practices as manifested in indigenous and situated processes of interpretation (M. H. Goodwin, 1990a: 6);
• describe the constitutive role of talk in different types of social organizations rather than “treating talk and social organization as two separate phenomena” (M. H. Goodwin, 2006a: 5);
• give theoretical and methodological preeminence to natives’ own concerns, interpretative theories and competencies over the anthropologist’s interpretation of their conduct according to pre-specified theoretical and political concerns (M. H. Goodwin, 2006a: 14);
• provide data records which can be made publicly accessible, repeatedly, and semi-independently (Clemente, 2008: 177–8).

For anthropologists using CA, CA is a response to Malinowski’s (1926: 125) call to abandon a hearsay anthropology based on interview questions and answers, and to develop “a new line of anthropological fieldwork: the study by direct
observation of the rules of custom as they function in actual life.” Moerman, the first anthropologist to use CA, goes as far as to propose that CA is the method that Geertz was looking for to study culture but failed to develop, a method that shows that words cannot be equated “mysteriously” with mental entities (Moerman, 1988: 89). Once anthropology’s “faulty notion of language as (solely) a representational code” (Sidnell, 2005b: 7) is replaced with a view of language as an instrument of action and social organization, CA provides an approach that is consonant with the goal of ethnography. As I show in the following sections, anthropologists using CA have argued that it allows them to do detailed moment-to-moment situated ethnography, “radical” ethnography (Moerman, 1993: 86), and not something in addition to ethnography.

## 2 Anthropology’s Influence on CA

In its origins, CA was influenced by Anthropology, as Sacks’ early work indicates. More recently, CA work conducted by anthropologists constitutes a second anthropological influence on CA.

Sacks was an avid reader of ethnographies, not only anthropological but also sociological, particularly Chicago School field studies and sociological ethnographies (Schegloff, 1992b: xlv, fn. 30). He admired anthropologists for their interest in observing and understanding behavior, as well as for their explanations and descriptions of what they observed. Sociologists often shared a common culture and language with their research subjects and the audience of their research. They did not need to pay attention, describe or explain (or analyze and make explicit) what their research subjects were doing and how they were doing it, because they could assume that they and their audience already knew this. On the other hand, anthropologists studied ‘exotic’ non-western societies with which they and their audience had little in common. Furthermore, anthropologists’ interest in cultural differences led them to study radically different cultures: the more different, the more anthropologically attractive. Faced with the task of translating, explaining and meaning-giving to ‘exotic’ customs to western audiences back home, anthropologists would often find ‘exotic’ actions for which there was no equivalent in their own culture, or for which there was an equivalent but one that was enacted in a different way (Schegloff, 1996a). In brief, because of a lack of shared commonsense knowledge or language with their research subjects, anthropologists did not have an “initial advantage” in Sacks’ “commentator machine” (Sacks, 1963: 6) and were forced to create, for themselves and for their audiences, descriptions of the procedures natives used to organize their social world.

In addition to his interest in ethnography, culture became central in Sacks’ Spring 1966 lectures, and it was an important theme in his Fall 1965 and Spring 1967 lectures (Schegloff, 1992a). The omnipresence of context also took much of his Winter 1967 lectures. Sacks conceptualized culture not as an available product to the social scientist who quickly concludes his/her analysis by attributing behaviors to it, but instead as “an apparatus for generating recognizable actions”
Thus, unlike Geertz and symbolic/interpretive anthropologists, who defined culture in terms of webs of mentalistic symbolic systems (Moerman, 1988: 88–9), Sacks was interested in observable actions and in members’ procedures to generate and detect these actions as recognizable.

Sacks’ lectures are replete with references to anthropologists who were doing research 25 or 30 years before him, mainly British social anthropologists and other structural functionalists (Sacks, 1992: I: 26–7). On the other hand, Sacks saw his own work as different from the anthropological work done by his contemporaries (see below the reasons for Sacks’ ultimate dissatisfaction with Anthropology). He briefly discussed the work of a few contemporaries, such as Berndt, Leach and Murdock (Sacks, 1992 I: 200–1, 451, 496, 725). Goodenough’s analysis of property and possessive pronoun usage in the Southwestern Pacific islands of Truk—now known as Chuuk—was a theoretical point of departure for Sacks’ distinction between possessables and possessitives (Sacks, 1992: I: 382–8). However, Albert’s description of turn-taking among the Barundi (1964) was the main piece of contemporary work that Sacks and colleagues discussed at length (Sacks, 1992: I: 624–32; Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974; Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). Sacks referred to these authors as he built observations about his objects of study, such as membership categorization devices, procedural knowledge and turn-taking (Sacks, 1992).

In terms of anthropologists who were doing research 25 or 30 years before him, Sacks considered the work of Colson, Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-Pritchard as he analyzed how teenagers talked about automobiles in group therapy. Building observations about membership categorization devices and member-formulations, Sacks noted that adolescents were defining themselves in their own terms with the category hotrodder and challenging adults’ way of categorizing them as teenagers (Sacks, 1992: I: 396–403). Sacks used Colson’s (1953) ethnography amongst the Makah Indians and Radcliffe-Brown’s (1948) amongst the Andaman Islanders to note that many tribes had categorical names that meant ‘outsider’ or ‘stranger.’ Like the names with which adults referred to Sacks’ teenagers in group therapy (e.g. teenager, kid in cars, kid teenage driver), these were names given by nonmembers, such as government interpreters from a different tribe, and not the names members used to identify themselves.

Apropos of teenagers’ automobile discussions, Evans-Pritchard’s (1940) observation that Nuer conversationalists sooner rather than later ended up discussing cattle also resonated with Sacks’ ultra-rich topics: inexhaustible and pervasively important conversational topics in some cultures (Sacks, 1992: I: 389–95, 601–4). Sacks qualified Evans-Pritchard’s observations methodologically, since saying that all Nuer conversations were about cattle was different from showing that they were (389). On this distinction, Sacks launched an analysis of the ‘inexhaustability’ of cars and their infinitely replaceable parts for teenagers.

Evans-Pritchard’s (1937) ethnography of the Azande, a north central African people, also attracted Sacks’ attention in his analysis of suicide as a procedure to find out if others care about oneself (Sacks, 1992: I: 32–9). Since the Azande do not
have an institutionalized notion of chance, why something happens to somebody is a matter of inquiry. Moreover, the Azande oracle procedure allows an individual to find out who is responsible among his/her neighbors for causing him/her trouble. In doing so, the Azande have an institutionalized procedure, missing in western societies, to find out who cares about him/her, and whether they care about one’s ill- or well-being.

Again, looking for the procedures that members rely on to make sense of their own and others’ actions in concrete circumstances, Sacks turned to Gluckman’s (1963) research on Barotse law as he formulated the “inference-making machine” (Sacks, 1992: I: 113–25). Sacks proposes building a machinery that can produce an actual occurrence of conversation: a social agency staff member answers a phone call by a man having some marital problems, concludes that the caller smacked his wife, and that the caller is not telling the truth. Sacks argues that the machinery must be able to “deal with and categorize and make statements about events it has not seen” (115–16). Furthermore, besides making inferences from categories, activities, and the sequentiality of events, these sequencing machines point to a much larger problem: how it is that an individual produces his/her actions in such a way that “sequencing machines can be used to find out what he’s up to” (119). Gluckman’s observation that even the behaviors of wrongdoers are subject to social stereotypes provides an example of this machinery at work. The customary ways that the Barotse assume wrongdoers behave, whether they actually do behave in that way or not, influence both the judges and the wrongdoers themselves. Even with only circumstantial evidence, judges make inferences and build up cases because they see specific actions within a total picture of how a wrongdoer typically behaves. That is, judges’ inference-making machinery deals with, categorizes, and makes statements about events for which judges may or may not have conclusive evidence, or in Sacks’ words above, for events that the inference-making machine “has not seen.” And wrongdoers will behave in customary ways, despite the fact that by doing so, they are carrying actions that are recognizably criminal.

Of all the anthropologists whose work Sacks was reading, Albert was the one who most captured his attention and sustained his interest. Sacks was formulating a machinery or system of rules of sequencing in conversation, independent of the content of the talk, the number of speakers present, who the parties were, and how many rounds a conversation had (Sacks, 1992: I: 482, 625–6). In her ethnographic analysis of the cultural patterns that organize talk among the Barundi in the kingdom of Burundi, Albert (1964) proposed a description of the rules that governed speech forms and manners across situations. For the Barundi, Albert’s rules of precedence involve that “the order in which individuals speak in a group is strictly determined by seniority of rank” (Albert, 1964: 40). This hierarchical order of talk amongst the Barundi posed one type of “next speaker solution” to Sacks’ “speaker sequencing problem” (Sacks, 1992: I: 624–32).

Without transcribed data to consult, Sacks theorizes about how Albert’s rules of precedence might work. Sacks tests various formulations of his theory and this ultimately fed into the turn-taking rules published eight years later by Sacks,
Schegloff and Jefferson (1974). We have Sacks’ concern with how speakers determine when the current speaker has finished and who will speak next. The Barundi only have a ‘speaker sequencing problem’ for the first round. Once the ranking of each speaker is assigned relative to the other speakers’ rankings, it is a matter of repetition of the order of the first round. Every speaker has a chance to talk, every speaker only speaks once per round, his/her opportunity is only his/hers because of the strict ranking order, and s/he does not need to listen to what others are saying, but to wait until his/her turn.

However, and within the parameters established by Albert’s description, Sacks notices problems in the application of ranking to conversations, primarily having to do with categories of persons and actions. First, problems will arise because different types of categorical systems will be combined: exclusive (e.g. if you are a commoner, you cannot be a prince and vice-versa) and nonexclusive (e.g. you can be simultaneously someone’s nephew and someone else’s father-in-law). Second, the rules are contingent on the appropriate categories relative to the ranking of speakers (e.g. a prince working as an employee: when is he to be treated as the son of England’s queen and when as an employee?), but the rules “don’t tell you when those categories are appropriately to be used” (Sacks, 1992: I: 629).

Third, Albert did not explain how the sequencing system dealt with participants’ filibustering or refusing to talk.

Sacks’ comments on Albert’s work illustrate both his deep admiration for and his ultimate dissatisfaction with Anthropology. Sacks lauded Evans-Pritchard’s ethnography of the Azande as “one of the greatest books in the social sciences” (Sacks, 1992: I: 34). He, with Schegloff and Jefferson, also claimed that Albert had come the closest of all social scientists to treating turn-taking as “a central phenomenon in its own right” (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974: 698). At the same time, Sacks was well aware that Anthropology was not the natural, observational, empirical social science he wanted to develop (Sacks, 1992: I: 802–5; Silverman, 1998: 54). Sacks’ Anthropology contemporaries did not produce transcripts but glossed interactions, asked questions from informants, relied on interview data, and used undescribed, tacitly assumed categories (i.e. categories lacking a procedural knowledge description). The question of relevance was at the heart of what is perhaps the first debate between Anthropology and CA (Schegloff & Sacks, 1974: 235). Schegloff and Sacks (1973: 291, fn. 4, emphasis in original) rejected anthropologist Hymes’ suggestion that they qualify their findings on conversational rules as pertaining specifically to American English:

> For example, that all conversations are in ‘American English’ is no warrant for so characterizing them. For there are many other characterizations which are equally ‘true’, e.g., that they are ‘adult’, ‘spoken’ (not yelled or whispered), etc. That the materials are all ‘American English’ does not entail that they are RELEVANTLY ‘American English’, or relevantly in any larger or smaller domain that might be invoked to characterize them.

Sacks and Schegloff were not arguing against characterizing some segment of talk as American English; however, some conduct could not be characterized as
American English *a priori* before first showing analytically how such identity was (i) constructed, understood and achieved procedurally (i.e. showing how the participants were “doing being” (Sacks, 1984b) American English); (ii) relevant for the participants themselves (i.e. participants oriented to it); and (iii) consequently and exclusively relevant (i.e. to the exclusion of other plausible identities or ways of characterizing such conduct). In brief, for Sacks and Schegloff, characterizing something as American English was an analytic problem to be resolved. Methodological and analytic divergences such as this one on relevance have continued to the present day between Anthropology and CA (Duranti, 1997a).

Sacks’ disenchantment with Anthropology continued to grow as he was laying down CA’s analytic and methodological foundations. His writing about anthropological work became increasingly rare. Starting with his Fall 1968 lectures, Sacks’ references to anthropological work were limited to previously discussed authors, whose work he reprised briefly. Anthropology’s diminishing presence in Sacks’ lectures coincided with his shift from analyses of membership categorization devices and category-bound activities to comparisons of transcribed data across collections. Whether Sacks’ shift was caused by an “incipient promiscuous use” of the former (Schegloff, 1992a: xlii) is debated (Silverman, 1998: 128–31).

As is apparent in Sacks’ lectures, the fact remains that as CA established itself with its domain of inquiry, methods and analysis, Anthropology’s influence on CA waned. At the same time, Sacks’ work became increasingly influential with a new generation of anthropologists, most notably, Moerman and M. H. Goodwin. The synthesis of CA and Anthropology represented by these scholars constitutes a second phase of influence which has (i) opened CA to research beyond English-speaking, adult, white, middle-class, North American and British individuals; and (ii) contributed to CA’s acknowledgment of its implicit use of ethnographic information (Hopper, 1990/91; Maynard, 2003).

More recently, Sidnell’s comparative CA edited volume (2009b) has continued this second influence in three ways. First, Sidnell’s volume builds upon and contributes to interdisciplinary research on social interaction (Enfield and Stivers, 2007; Stivers, Enfield & Levinson, 2010). Second, it articulates a CA comparative theoretical framework. Third, it expands non-English language CA research (Fox, Hayashi & Jasperson, 1996; Hayashi, 2003a; Sorjonen, 2001a; for a discussion of Schegloff’s and Heritage’s students conducting CA research on non-English languages, see Čmejrková & Prevignano, 2003; Prevignano & Thibault, 2003a) to an increasing number of languages—although American and African languages are still underrepresented. It remains to be seen in what ways the quickly expanding field of CA will be influenced by these new avenues of dialog and collaboration spearheaded by anthropologists.

3 CA’s Influence on Anthropology

CA’s influence on Anthropology is twofold: on specific anthropologists who have adopted CA as one of their research methods, and on the entire subfield of linguistic anthropology. In terms of the latter, CA has made a lasting impression on
the entire subfield of linguistic anthropology by making conversation a “proper subject for study” (Duranti, 1997a: 246). Linguistic anthropologists have adopted some of CA’s methodological apparatus and, with it, some CA theory: for instance, the concepts of turn-constructional unit, adjacency pair, preference and recipient design (Duranti, 1997a: 245–79, 2005; Heritage, 2008b). Furthermore, CA is frequently discussed, whether it is critiqued or praised, a point that this chapter illustrates with the abundance of linguistic anthropological work that makes reference to CA. Moreover, CA’s insistence on audio-/video-recorded data and detailed transcriptions have contributed to the expectation that transcripts will be included in the “interaction-centered anthropology of language” (Schegloff, Ochs & Thompson, 1996: 7). The repeated problematization of the transcript attests to its centrality in the social study of situated language use (see section 1 above).

Anthropologists who have adopted CA to conduct detailed moment-to-moment situated ethnographies have produced work that is distinctly anthropological as evidenced by the fact that they regard CA not as something in addition to the ethnographic enterprise, but as central to it. These anthropologists do not have a unified position on how to combine ethnographic and conversation analytic data, but they share: (i) a cautious use of ethnographic data; (ii) a structuring of ethnographic studies according to CA analytic concerns; (iii) a presentation of detailed examinations of single episodes which are based on aggregated collections; and (iv) analyses of transcribed data using CA’s analytic apparatus in stricto sensu, even while in conjunction with other methodologies and theoretical concepts. In what follows, I examine the conversation analytic work of Moerman, M. H. Goodwin, Sidnell, and Clemente, as illustrations of this type of work.

Moerman is an interdisciplinary pioneer on multiple accounts: he was the first scholar to combine CA with ethnographic methods, and also the first to apply CA to a language other than English. Moerman (1988: 70) describes the goal of his synthesis of CA and ethnography in the following way: “Contexted conversation analysis is directed toward discovering which of the many culturally available distinctions are active and relevant to the situation, how these distinctions are brought to bear, and what they consist of.”

Three features characterize Moerman’s analysis: (i) the presentation of two closely tied, but still distinguishable, analyses; (ii) the bottom-up ordering of these analyses, with the CA technical description first; and (iii) the reliance on CA-style single episodes of conversational events over aggregated data collections from a wide range of interactions. Even though he uses collections (Moerman, 1977, 1988) as the best way to identify methodic and anonymous sequential structures, Moerman prefers a line-by-line approach to single episodes because it allows him to “connect conversational structures—the compelling syntax and sinews of talk—with the flesh and the spirit of culture, motives and lived experience” (Moerman, 1996: 155). However, Moerman underscores that an analyst conducting a line-by-line contexted CA approach “cannot make use of categorical features of the parties, of the setting, or of other aspects of context unless he can show the parties themselves orienting to those aspects of the context” (Moerman, 1996: 155). In this
manner, Moerman’s culturally contexted CA only uses ethnographic knowledge that can be shown to be procedurally relevant to the ongoing talk.

Moerman’s culturally contexted CA represents the only existing programmatic proposal of a CA-ethnography combination with explicit methodological parameters that formalize the integration and circumscription of the ethnographer’s own knowledge, his/her invocation of such knowledge, and his/her interpretation of the data within a CA-type of analysis.

M. H. Goodwin, together with C. Goodwin, has been responsible for bringing CA to Anthropology journals (C. Goodwin, 1994; M. H. Goodwin, 1980b, 1982a, 1982b). Their work has pushed the boundaries of CA with research on gender and play among African American and Latino children (M. H. Goodwin, 1990a, 1995, 1998), institutionalized racism (C. Goodwin, 1994), disabilities (C. Goodwin, 1995a, 2003b), multimodal practices in ordinary and institutional settings (C. Goodwin, 1981, 1996; C. Goodwin & M. H. Goodwin, 1992; M. H. Goodwin, 1996), and power (M. H. Goodwin, 2006a). Furthermore, M. H. Goodwin’s (1990a) landmark study of the role of situated talk in the social organization of African American working-class boys and girls, has been a point of reference for both Anthropology and CA for the last 20 years. More recently, M. H. Goodwin (2006a) has examined social practices such as name-calling, insults, storytelling, gossip, and pejorative descriptions and assessments, with which a group of upper-middle class North American girls construct social difference and exclusion. Goodwin’s work is novel for its complex, situated, multimodal interactional analysis of children’s verbal and nonverbal behavior, as well as for her examination of the interplay between situated talk, socio-economic class, and race.

M. H. Goodwin’s methodological contributions can be summarized as follows. First, Goodwin uses two types of ethnographic information: macro and micro. Macro-ethnographic information is trans-situational, self-contained, precedes the CA-based chapters, and may include transcribed talk that is not analyzed exhaustively, turn-by-turn. Micro-ethnographic information is circumscribed to specific excerpts of situated, transcribed data. Second, she presents a single CA-informed analysis. Third, Goodwin avoids invoking either micro- or macro-ethnographic information as independent resources to account for participants’ motivations on a particular occasion (ten Have & Psathas, 1995a: xvi–xvii). In this way, Goodwin refrains from attributional statements such as The participant did X because s/he thinks Y, or s/he is Z, where Z is a cultural, linguistic or identity membership categorization defined by the researcher. Fourth, Goodwin avoids using information gained via interviews to support her interactional analysis. Instead, she uses the CA practice of grounding her analysis in how participants display to each other their interpretations of others’ talk and actions sequentially. Finally, her analysis differs from more strict CA types of analyses in her use of some categorical labels (e.g. her comparison of girls’ and boys’ directive use) and in her combination of CA with other approaches (e.g. her three fold analysis of stories as participant structures, Goffman’s frame analysis (Goffman, 1974) and Labov, et al.’s narrative analysis (Labov, 1972a; Labov & Waletzky, 1968)).
Goodwin, like Moerman, was criticized for failing to address how her work relates to other approaches to discourse and its implications vis-à-vis ongoing controversies (Corsaro, 1992). Nevertheless, her work was enthusiastically received with minor criticisms for her limited use of ethnography and narrow operationalization of context (Alves, 1992; Haviland, 1992).

Sidnell’s work represents an invigorating bridge that takes up debates from the 1980s–1990s and moves them into new collaborations in the 21st century. As Moerman and Goodwin before him, he pushes the boundaries of CA by focusing on male peer interactions in and around an Indo-Guyanese rumshop (Sidnell, 2005b). His approach is similar to Goodwin’s: (i) macro-, self-contained ethnographic data; (ii) micro-, situated ethnographic data circumscribed to specific sequences of talk in a single CA-informed analysis; (iii) the inclusion of non-CA concepts, such as Wittgenstein’s language game; and (iv) exclusive CA analyses of transcribed data.

Despite his extensive use of ethnographic data, Sidnell’s ethnography has also been critiqued for failing to include a programmatic discussion of the ethnography-CA relationship and of how to apply CA to ethnography (Kiesling, et al., 2009). An aspect of Sidnell’s work that draws significant attention (and criticism) is his support of CA’s claims that conversation may be an autonomous and universal (i.e. species-specific) order of social organization, which is independent of context and the primordial site of sociality (Gaudio, 2003).

Finally, Clemente (2005) continues in the tradition of CA-informed ethnographies. In his analysis of information withholding in a pediatric cancer unit in Catalonia, Spain, Clemente (2007) draws on CA institutional research (Drew & Heritage, 1992b; Heritage & Maynard, 2006a; Maynard, 2003) and ‘natural history of illness’ ethnographic descriptions found in medical and psychological anthropology. Like his predecessors, Clemente carries out CA work with a non-English, non-adult population. However, his work differs in that he juxtaposes but does not combine CA and ethnographic datasets and analyses.

Anthropologists such as Moerman, M. H. Goodwin, Sidnell and Clemente illustrate the reiterative process of mutual influence between CA and Anthropology. Sacks was influenced by anthropologists such as Albert, Colson, Gluckman, Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-Pritchard, while in turn, Sacks influenced a new generation of anthropologists, some of whom adopted CA as central to their ethnographic work. Now, the CA work carried out by anthropologists and the new avenues of dialog opened by Levinson, Sidnell and their colleagues are influencing yet another generation of CA scholars.

4 Future Directions

In this chapter, I have examined the relationship between Anthropology and CA from multiple perspectives. Despite—or because of—these longstanding interdisciplinary debates, CA and Anthropology have left, and continue to leave, an indelible impression on each other. Anthropology’s influence on CA can be seen...
in Sacks’ lectures and initial publications, in CA’s research on different languages, cultures, ages, genders, races and socioeconomic classes, and in CA’s acknowledgment of its implicit use of ethnographic information. In turn, CA’s influence on Anthropology can be seen in the adoption, by specific anthropologists, of CA as central to their ethnographic research, in making conversation a proper subject of study, and in making transcribed data indispensable in the social study of language.

Without proposing (or imposing) a unified approach to the study of social interaction, anthropologists and conversation analysts are finding new areas of collaboration. I will highlight four interrelated areas of shared interest: comparative CA, the search of the universal characteristics of interactional organizations, theoretical CA, and longitudinal CA.

Comparative CA will continue to uncover the cultural/linguistic inflections that affect how participants resolve everyday problems in talk-in-interaction. As descriptive CA studies emerge from non-western languages and cultures, particularly indigenous languages and cultures in Africa, Pacific-Oceania, the Americas, and most of Asia, future studies will show the degree to which locally available semiotic resources of greatly diverse cultures and grammars inflect generic problems and practices of interaction. Furthermore, they will also shed light on whether there exist general patterns of local inflections of generic practices shared by a language family (e.g. Austronesian, Indo-European, Niger-Congo, Trans-New Guinean) or by a group of interrelated cultures.

Universal characteristics of interactional organizations will build on comparative CA to develop models of the universal characteristics of interactional organizations, such as preference, reference, turn-taking, repair, epistemic stance, and the formulation of action. These models will need to be finessed to include the largest number of languages and cultures possible, and ideally, to include all languages and cultures.

Theoretical CA will also advance. As CA studies accumulate evidence and theory on the mechanisms of social interaction, CA is in a position to engage with non-CA scholars on larger theoretical concerns such as the conceptualization of cultural and linguistic relativity (Sidnell & Enfield, 2012), the intersection of the ‘interaction order’ (Goffman, 1983) and other social systems and social institutions (Heritage, 2008b; Raymond, 2003), gender, power and inequality (Kitzinger, 2000), and human sociality (Enfield & Levinson, 2006).

Finally, longitudinal CA is developing a new frontier by moving CA beyond the synchronic analysis of isolated episodes or moments of interaction to diachronic analyses based on repeated interactions of a constant group of people/genre/contexts over time (Beach, 2001b: 224–5; Maynard, 2003: 78–9). Whether it is the history of a family dealing with cancer from diagnosis to death (Beach, 2009), social changes in news interview broadcasts over 20 years (Clayman & Heritage, 2002a), or cognitive and interactional developments occurring over 27 months during the first years of a baby girl (Wootton, 1997), these studies identify interactional practices, connect episodic moments of interaction, and are clearly "context-sensitive" to the local circumstances, concerns and relationships of the
parties [...]” (Beach, 2001b: 224). In doing so, ‘context-sensitive’ CA studies are creating another avenue of collaboration, since these studies come very close to the line-by-line explicated CA analysis advocated by Moerman and practiced by himself, Goodwin, Sidnell and Clemente in the CA-ethnographic studies discussed in this chapter.

In conclusion, anthropologists and conversation analysts have found and continue to find reasons to agree and disagree over why and how to study situated language use. In doing so, they are transforming each other and discovering the processes that organize social interaction.

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